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In the context of the presidential election in the United States and the EU referendum 
in the UK, Oxford showed the term ‘post-truth’ gaining immense popularity, especially 
in conjunction with ‘politics’ and ‘society’; by the end of 2016 Oxford Dictionaries 
declared it as the word of the year (English Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2018). Post-
truth is an adjective which refers to ‘circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’, and 
even though the concept has been around for centuries, several philosophers have 
resorted to blaming postmodernism for our ‘post-truth’ politics. 
A relatively mild accusation is put forward by A. C. Grayling who, in a BBC 
interview, identified postmodernism and relativism as the intellectual roots which are 
‘lurking in the background’ of post-truth (Coughlan, 2017). A harsher accusation is 
made by Daniel Dennett, who maintained that people should begin to realise that 
philosophers are not as harmless as generally thought, and that philosophical notions 
(such as the ones espoused by postmodernists) can have serious consequences that 
can come true. He goes on to say: 
I think what the postmodernists did was truly evil. They are responsible for the 
intellectual fad that made it respectable to be cynical about truth and facts. You’d have 
people going around saying: ‘Well, you’re part of that crowd who still believe in facts’ 
(Cadwaladr, 2017). 
It may also be fit to note that such criticisms have not been levelled by philosophers, 
exclusively. In his piece ‘“Preparing for the incalculable”: Deconstruction, Justice, and 
the Question of Education’ (2001), Biesta maintains that it is a widely held notion 
amongst educators and educational theorists such as Beyer and Listen (1992) and Hill 
et. al. (1999) that postmodern philosophy is untenable for the moral and political 
support required for the project of education. For these theorists, ‘postmodernism 
threatens to cripple the very concept of the political in the human and social sciences’ 
(McLaren and Lankshear, 1994, 392). One of the central targets of this debate has 




been Jacques Derrida and his philosophy of deconstruction. Deconstruction has often 
been accused of being a critical analysis which destroys everything in its path, with 
many arguing that it has very dangerous nihilistic and hyper-relativistic implications 
(Ferry and Renaut 1990; Fleming 1996; Habermas 1987). 
I claim that one of the best ways out of our social malaise is through education; 
as a proponent of postmodern philosophy I argue (against those who say otherwise) 
that not only does it make sense to use it as a thinking cap through which we can re-
think education, but also to use this thought to help us better understand how we have 
ended up in our post-truth world, and consequently, how to go forward. In this paper, 
to acquaint the reader with the philosopher and ‘his’ philosophy, I shall begin by putting 
forward an account of one of Derrida’s most seminal texts, ‘Structure, Sign and Play 
in the Discourse of Human Sciences’ (1967), which is, famously, his formal critique on 
structuralism and western metaphysics. I will then go on to comment on the 
relationship between deconstruction and truth in order to provide context to the next 
section of the paper, in which I will be arguing how a deconstructivist perspective 
tackles important and recurring topics in education such as justice and responsibility, 
amongst others, to show its relevance to education. There are, of course, a plethora of 
other channels and methods to be explored if we are to call ourselves serious about 
doing away with the problems resulting from our post-truth world. My argument is 
simply that a deconstructivist perspective to education can act as a tool which may 
allow us to move a step away from our post-truth world, a step in the right direction 
 
The Myth and the Origin  
Jacques Derrida presented his paper, ‘Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of 
Human Sciences’, at the Johns Hopkins International Colloquium in October 1966, 
which was an international seminar on structuralism. Ironically, Derrida’s lecture 
subverted the certainties of structuralism by questioning the very concept of structure. 
In his work, he effectively identifies flaws in western logocentrism: from ancient Greek 
philosophy up to structuralism. Derrida begins his work by referring to the history of 
the concept of structure and to an ‘event’ in this history which is ‘loaded with meaning’. 
The notion of ‘event’ in the history of the structurality of structure is how it had always 
already been at work and neutralised due to a fixed origin, which he argues had been 
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spontaneously attributed. The aim of having a fixed point, a centre to the structure, is 
to limit what Derrida calls the free play of the structure. He goes on to argue that it has 
been ‘forbidden’ for elements at the centre to be substituted; but this does not mean 
that the substitution of the centre was/is impossible, but rather, that it has been 
prohibited from changing (352). Play, therefore, refers to that which resists the 
organization of the structure.  
Derrida points out that the centre of the structure is both inside the structure, 
as well as independent from it, in order to control it. He thus refutes the law of identity 
by claiming that ‘the centre is not the centre’ (1978, 352). Derrida analyses the history 
of western philosophy to maintain this. But what types of centres existed? Derrida 
names a few: essence, transcendentality, consciousness, God, Man, and so on. It 
should be noted that for every centred concept which existed, by default, there were 
concepts which were marginalized, thus creating a hierarchy of binary oppositions. 
The ‘event’ is, therefore, a (re)thinking of structure, which is simultaneously a rupture 
as well as a repetition. This happened with the linguistic turn as language burst into 
the scene and replaced the centre with discourse. Instead of a structure of concepts, 
there was a collection of signs, that is, language. The word became intrinsically 
intertwined with concept which gave rise to a ‘play of signification’. Words, that is, 
signs, could possess meaning within an infinite play (354). Derrida explains that even 
his greatest influences have denounced metaphysics whilst relying on it: Nietzsche’s 
critique of metaphysics, the Freudian critique of self-presence/consciousness and 
Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics and of the determination of Being as 
presence. He maintains that this pattern of thought can even be found within the 
human sciences, whose ‘critique of ethnocentrism’ runs parallel to the destruction of 
the history of metaphysics (345–355). All of Western thought, according to Derrida, 
formed pairs of binary oppositions in which one member of the pair is privileged, thus 
freezing the play of the system, whilst marginalising the other member of the pair.  
Derrida goes on to analyse Claude Levi-Strauss’ mythological studies and 
unearths the weaknesses of the epistemological quest for the unity of a structure. 
Structuralism, as Derrida maintains, has become a critique of itself. In his work, The 
Raw and the Cooked (1964, 1996), Levi-Strauss privileges the Bororo myth, a 
‘reference myth’ which he places at the centre of the structure of his mythology. It is 




not the analysis of the myths as such that is important, but the methodology of analysis, 
that is, the basic principles of a structural approach to the myths and mythology in 
general. The idea, basically, is that myths cannot be understood in isolation, but as 
parts of a system. Derrida, however, questions why this myth is privileged over other 
myths and surmises that this myth was not preferred by Strauss because it stands out 
from other myths, but because it holds an irregular position within a group of myths. In 
this case, there exists no valid reason for choosing one centre over another because 
any choice that is made will ultimately be arbitrary (357–360). Furthermore, Derrida 
also shows how the myth itself is decentralised in terms of its origin, which means that 
it cannot have a pure centre, nor can it be a centre in and of itself. In this sense, 
structural discourse on myths must itself be mythomorphic (363). What Levi-Strauss 
aims to do in his work is to gauge the underlying structure of the myth, in this case, 
the ‘grammar’, in order to understand the language that is the myth. In this sense, a 
primary code would provide substance, that is, the substance of language, while the 
secondary code are the myths and the tertiary code (that of critical discourse) allows 
for the translatability of myths. But this meant that the discourse in Levi-Strauss’ work 
is itself a myth, the myth of mythology. And as long as myths are anonymous, so too is 
this discourse, the function of which ‘makes the philosophical or epistemological 
requirement of a centre appear as mythological, that is to say, a historical illusion’ 
(Derrida 1978, 363). 
From these arguments Derrida concludes that there exist two kinds of 
interpretation. One is nostalgic for a sign which is free from free-play, one which 
‘dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play’ (369). The other kind 
of interpretation is ‘no longer a turn toward the origin, affirms man and tried to pass 
beyond Man and Humanism’ (369). Though it may seem like Derrida urges us to 
choose the latter form of interpretation, that is, the one which affirms the free-play of 
meaning, he maintains that one cannot simply choose between two interpretations of 
interpretation. This is because, according to him, there exists no authoritative centre 
which validates our choice. The consequences which stem from this are impossible to 
predict; however, we must strive to not be among those who ‘turn their eyes away 
when faced by as yet an unnameable which is proclaiming itself’ (370). Due to the 
scope and limitations of this paper, I shall not be delving deeper into Derrida’s analysis 
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of Levi-Strauss’ work. However, I believe that this section provides the reader with the 
brief understanding required to move on to the next sections of the paper. 
 
Between Text and Truth 
The word for ‘text’ in Latin is texere, which stands for the verb, ‘to weave’ and is 
cognate with techne in Greek (art or craft). The word ‘text’ still holds that meaning. 
Evidently, the use of ‘text’ to describe a passage or book is possible by way of referring 
to the action of weaving. This is arguably because it is appropriate to think about the 
way in which a text or book is ‘put together’, by how writing is woven into a text by the 
fabric of language. But what about the ‘true’ reading of the text? In a post-truth society, 
should the educator’s job be to ‘find’ Truth? I argue not. 
The text, as it has been thought of throughout history, is a vehicle for meaning. 
The word ‘text’ can have a twofold sense. In the narrow sense, one can consider the 
text as Ricoeur does, as ‘discourse as writing’ (1975, 66). This is the most popular view 
of text: it is the nature of the text to become discourse, which raises fundamental 
hermeneutical questions regarding the text. In the broad sense, we can think about 
the text as referring to everything which offers itself to interpretation (Byrne, 1990). 
But language opposes the text to all the things it represents, that is, the World, God, 
Consciousness, the Real and so on. So, is the best kind of text that one which gives 
accurate accounts of such things? 
Texts do not convey the ‘right’ or ‘true’ impression, which is misleading. There 
is, therefore, a rhetorical fortification between the ‘truth’ and the text. History has taught 
us that the text is on the outside, and the ‘truth’ of the text is hidden away, somewhere 
on the inside. But according to the same logic, the ‘truth’ of the text is hidden on the 
inside because it lies outside the text, far from being anywhere close to the text. One 
is therefore faced with a history-laden prejudice, bound by the empirical (text) and the 
transcendental (truth) (Derrida, 1972, 2016). 
Deconstruction, therefore, deals with the text in a way that prompts questions 
about the limits and borders of the text. The meaning of a text is defined by its borders, 
by opposing it to other concepts, that is, definition through difference. So 
deconstruction asks: ‘what are the borders, and why do they exist?’ Indeed, this is 
precisely what Derrida does in his work, ‘Living on/Borderlines’ (1979). It may, 




therefore, be argued that one fails to read text if they make rash decisions or 
generalisations about what the text is about or what it means. We must abandon our 
logocentric yearning for the presence of meaning and instead be patient enough to 
read the text slowly and carefully. This is what Kafka maintains in one of his great 
aphorisms: ‘All human errors are impatience, a premature breaking-off of methodical 
procedure, an apparent fencing in of what is apparently at issue’ (Kafka, 1994, 3). 
Like all of Derrida’s terms, deconstruction occupies two contradictory 
meanings: destruction/(re)construction. As has been shown in the previous section of 
this paper, the projects of enlightenment metaphysics—namely the epistemological, 
ethical, aesthetic, and other institutions and structures—need to be de-sedimented in 
order to expose their underlying assumptions and contradictory logic. But 
deconstruction must also (re)construct. This (re)construction, however, cannot erect 
‘ideal’ or ‘pure’ structures. In this sense, deconstruction is the undoing, and 
desedimenting of structures, which in a certain sense is more historical than the 
structuralist movement it called into question (Derrida, 1976, 2016, lxxviii). Rather than 
destroying structure, it is necessary to understand how the ‘ensemble’ was constituted 
and to reconstruct it to this end. Deconstruction, therefore, names the conditions 
according to which institutions are constituted in order to understand the context within 
which they were built. For Derrida, this desedimenting and decentring, particularly of 
the logos, is an affirmation. As he maintains in ‘Ellipsis’: ‘Why would one mourn for the 
centre? Is not the centre, the absence of play and difference, another name for death?’ 
(1978, 297).  
It is also at the end of ‘Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences’ (1978) that Derrida voices his concern about an ‘affirmation [that] 
determines the noncentre otherwise than as loss of the centre’ (292). Deconstruction, 
then, does not set out to break down institutions in order to erect others in its place. 
Rather, it persistently opens up institutions to their own alterity which makes the 
structure within the institution change and adapt. In this sense of alterity, a non-
concept can act against the sedimenting of dogmatic thought. As I attempt to bring 
deconstruction to the fore of educational discourse, I wish to note that what 
deconstruction has to offer is not a set of formulas, rules or regulations which should 
be applied to education, but rather a perspective, a rethinking of education, whilst 
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analysing the hidden and underlying assumptions in the ethical, the political or the 
juridical. Cahen (2001) maintains that if one acknowledges the radically affirmative 
nature of deconstruction, then, the question of deconstruction is also the question of 
education. 
 
On Deconstruction and its Others 
In this section, I will be focusing on the relationship between deconstruction and the 
topics of religion, the other, racism and justice in the context of education. There are, 
of course, a plethora of others that can be discussed; but I have specifically chosen 
these topics because I believe that post-truth propaganda seeks to interfere with one’s 
moral thinking and, as such, one should not only know how to refute fake news and 
discern whether sources are reliable, but also attempt to remedy the damage that has 
been made.  
Derrida’s text helps us tackle recurring topics in education that are still very 
relevant today—topics which have been misconstrued through post-truth politics. One 
of these is religion. Whether it is Allah, Yahweh or Christ, God can never be completely 
represented by imperfect human beings. We live in an age in which a multitude of 
conflicts are being shaped by people who claim that God is on their side. From a 
Derridean perspective, it may be argued that, as the world’s main religions claim to be 
built upon unshakeable foundations, they do not always provide us with clear meaning 
and certainty (Taylor, 2004). Following this argument, it may be said that such religious 
traditions cast further doubt, and call security and certainty into question. As we 
become more connected, not only are conservatism and religious fundamentalism 
around the world becoming more manifest, but also the number of misconceptions 
about what religion does and for what it stands. It is therefore important to educate our 
students about what religion is and how it means, but also how to criticise and question 
it. It is important to note that questioning one’s beliefs does not mean abandoning 
them. Rather, it means becoming more thorough and rigorous in one’s beliefs.  
Furthermore, to privilege one religion and to teach one, exclusively, would mean 
to marginalise all others. I am not saying that schools of faith should not teach their 
religion of practice in favour of others, but rather that one should be taught other 
religions alongside the main religion of practice. In this sense, students get a more 




well-rounded and holistic perspective of what religion is as a concept. This may also 
help clear up several misconceptions and inconsistent or fallacious arguments brought 
about by post-truth propaganda. Furthermore, as our classes become increasingly 
multicultural, there is a growing demand for such a practice. It is, therefore, our 
responsibility to create classrooms in which we continuously seek to create an 
environment within which students can respect each other, even if they do not agree 
with them. 
In this sense, respect for the other means to respect the other in their otherness. 
Encountering the other opens us to new experiences and perspectives about the world 
and, as such, we must always strive to be hospitable towards the other. Integration 
does not equal assimilation, so that, when guest meets host, it is important that neither 
are totalized, and neither lose their identity. In this sense, it is imperative for us to 
safeguard both identities, whilst simultaneously creating a space within which the other 
and I can integrate and develop a common culture. In the context of globalization, one 
of the responsibilities of a deconstructivist educator is to recognise that they (as well 
as the curriculum) should go beyond Eurocentrism. As Egea-Kuhene maintains, ‘While 
upholding the memory of a philosophical heritage essentially Euro-Christian (Greek, 
Roman, Jewish, Christian and Islamic, or Mediterranean/Central European, or Greco-
Roman-Arab/Germanic), it is necessary to both recognise its origins, and go beyond 
its limits’ (2004, 27). It is important to note that this should not be done for the sake of 
difference, but for the appreciation and understanding of perspectives which we may, 
perhaps inadvertently, silenced.  
Another recurring theme in education, and certainly one that has been 
magnified due to fake news, is racism. When anti-racism is taught, it must never be the 
end of teaching for anti-racism. It cannot be codified into a piece of the curriculum as 
it is taught. Anti-racism must, therefore, become the starting point for a pedagogical 
investigation into racism. So, if a student has been educated to be against racism, they 
must never think that there exists some identifiable thing that racism is (Bingham, 
2008). This is not to say that the student should not identify it as a concept, but rather, 
that they understand that the binary oppositions of black and white are nothing more 
than a social construction. There exists no foundation for privileging one over the other, 
for if it were the case, how white would one have to be, in order to be white? And 
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consequently, how black must one have to be, in order to be classified as black? This 
is just the beginning. Bingham asserts that teaching in this deconstructive sense must 
include education about combating injustice. If my student ‘learns’ to combat racism, 
then they must commit themselves to the long-term project of combating racism (30). 
So, just as the educator must offer their interpretation of racism, so too must the pupils 
learn to make interpretations about what racism is. What Derrida maintains about 
critical pedagogy is that there exists no pure critical pedagogy unless the student is 
aware that they are embroiled within a society which needs interpretation. As Bingham 
writes: 
I must say to myself: ‘Alright, I have learned a classroom way, if not perhaps my 
teacher’s own idiosyncratic way, of fighting social power. Now, I have my own 
interpretations to make. From now on, I will put my own stamp on what social power 
may or may not be. Now, I must foster my own way of creating social change. For, I 
now know that there is no social power that is simply “there”, that can be pointed to in 
some non-obtrusive way. When I identify oppression in the future, I will have the 
responsibility of knowing that such an identification is my own interpretation’ (Bingham, 
2008, 30). 
My education as a rigorously-minded pupil must begin over and over. In other words, 
I must constantly re-assess my own values, interpretations and principles. My 
‘education’ must not end after the professor delivers their lecture. My constant re-
assessment must be ceaseless, for if it stops then I will be stagnant as I, by default, will 
end up holding on to (and privilege) a new centre. In a sense, this holds true for 
educators with regard to the way they teach their subjects. The university system often 
calls upon educators to act as if they were beginners—as Bingham argues, educational 
practice at all levels has a ‘certain mandate of erasure’ (2008, 19). In this sense, one 
may think of the philosophy professor who must teach Platonic philosophy to new 
students of philosophy or the physics teacher who must teach first-year physics as 
though quantum mechanics did not exist. This of course also goes for the way one 
teaches. For a professor to be a better teacher, they must constantly review the way 
they teach. This does not necessarily mean that they will understand the material any 




better. It means that hopefully, with time they will convey what they teach in better 
ways for the benefit of their students. 
In this context, one can also discuss the relationship between deconstruction 
and justice in educational discourse. Justice, as Derrida (1992) maintains, is always 
directed towards the other, it is a relation to the other. Justice, however, cannot be 
spoken about directly by saying ‘this is just’, because to do so would mean to betray 
the concept. In this sense, declaring an action to be just dismisses the possibility for 
the other to voice whether justice has been rendered. If justice concerns itself with the 
other as other, in their otherness, then by definition we can neither totalize nor foresee, 
because if justice addresses itself to the very singularity of the other, then one is under 
the obligation to keep the possibility of the in-coming of the other open. It may therefore 
be argued that we can never really decide on what Justice is out of concern and 
consideration for the otherness of the other. More than ever, we are living in times 
when we are surrounded by different tongues and voices. It is in this sense that justice 
is denied if one does not address one’s self to every individual voice. As Derrida 
declares: ‘Deconstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an alterity which 
necessarily calls, summons or motivates it. Deconstruction is, therefore, a vocation — 
“a response to a call”’ (1984, 118). 
In terms of justice, deconstruction is heavily concerned with the question of 
alterity, the question regarding the other, so the ethico-political horizon of 
deconstruction can be portrayed as a concern for the other (Biesta, 2001). For Derrida, 
we can further our understanding of the other through our encounter with the 
otherness of the other. This experience though is always a particular one and, in this 
regard, must not be generalised into a recognisable language of ethics. There is, 
however, a very tense dynamic at play between the experience of the other and the 
universality of language. In this regard, the relationship between the other and a 
universal language is a central theme in education. A tangible example of this 
relationship is put forward by Edgoose (2001). In his essay, Just decide! Derrida and 
the Ethical Aporias of Education, he describes a situation in which a difficult student in 
their most challenging class, who had not previously responded to the educator’s 
teaching, suddenly makes a lot of effort and progress in their assignments. The 
student’s grades, however, are not high enough to pass the module. Should the 
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educator offer the student a deal whereby the student would pass if they continued to 
show a significant amount of progress in their work? Would it be ‘ethical’ or ‘just’ to 
make this offer? Should the educator bend the rules, or should he or she stick to their 
grading rubric and not offer the deal? What would it mean to be a just educator? 
The educator could turn to an educational ethics text for guidance, in which 
case he might conclude that an ethics of care might probably lead him to offer the deal 
and deontology might not, but which one is correct? The educator is caught between 
what policy dictates and the uniqueness of the situation. Nevertheless, one has to 
decide, ‘but a just decision is impossible – this very mad impossibility makes justice 
possible… Justice comes, then, from the failure of fluency, from an ethical hesitation 
in which the said reveals its Saying’ (2001, 129). As Kierkegaard knew well, between 
the universal and the particular, one must leap. Derrida’s analysis of justice does not 
oppose the attention that one must give to the particular other, nor does it dismiss a 
necessity for the universal in the pursuit of justice. From a Derridean perspective, it 
may be argued that an educator is just if he or she constantly negotiates between his 
or her responsibility towards many others, and the need to be intelligible as an 
educator in a bureaucracy (130). The educator must negotiate between the curricular 
requirements set by their educational authorities, whilst simultaneously being the fair 
educator that the students, parents and colleagues expect him or her to be. 
As Edgoose argues, such a negotiation exposes the educator beyond ethics in 
a traditional sense as deconstruction does not provide an ethical calculus which must 
be followed as a guide to justice. Neither justice-based ethical theories nor caring-
based theories which concern the particular shall suffice. In this sense, Derrida 
highlights the unstable ways in which these approaches coexist in a caring justice 
(131). In a world which is dealing with the highest levels of displaced people since 
World War Two, today’s classrooms are more diverse, and it is because of this that a 
deconstructivist perspective to education is important. Of course, this does not 
guarantee that educators will always make the right choice, or that they will always be 
just. It does, however, prohibit the educator from being complacent and simply doing 
as policy dictates. Furthermore, deconstructivist education highlights the importance 
of encountering the other, of being sensitive to the other’s needs, and of constantly 
negotiating in terms of what counts as ‘just’ for each individual he or she encounters. 






In this paper, I have explored how Derrida’s ‘concept’ of deconstruction is at work in 
recurring topics in education such as religion, the other, racism and justice in order to 
argue for how such a perspective can help us move away from our post-truth problem. 
It has also been shown that, despite harsh criticism, deconstruction is neither nihilistic 
nor relativistic. Rather, it offers a playful strategy of interpretation that allows for the 
complexity and heterogeneity of reality, one which does not endorse rejection of truth 
but ‘Truth’. Deconstruction does not guarantee that one will always ‘do the right thing’. 
At the limits and heart of deconstruction lie hesitation and confusion, but it is the same 
hesitation and confusion which make us question our values and principles. It is 
therefore important that, in a post-truth world, educators are sensitive to the many 
others whom they are confronted with daily. I have argued that educators must go 
beyond teaching students about how to refute fake news by incorporating the 
encouragement of activism and critical analysis against the many misconceptions 
propagated by such news. In these tumultuous times, it is also imperative to recognise 
the insurmountable limitations and inherent contradictions within the norms that 
govern our actions. This recognition may, in turn, contribute to keeping one’s norms 
open to constant questioning and assessment, as ‘[there] can be no ethical action 
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